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• Provide observations on the Department’s efforts to manage its 
2009 portfolio of major weapon system programs, performance of 
newer programs, and ability to deliver to the warfighter on time
• Analyze outcomes and knowledge attained at key junctures in the 
acquisition process for a subset of the 42 programs primarily still in 
development
• Gather data on other factors that might impact program stability 
and outcomes such as: cost estimating, requirement setting, 
software management, and program office staffing
• Provide an update on any impacts from DOD acquisition policy 
changes and Congressional acquisition reform legislation
3Observations on DOD’s Fiscal Year 2009 
Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolio
• DOD’s major defense acquisition portfolio grew to 102 programs 
in July 2009 - a net increase of 6 programs since December 2007.
• Eighteen programs in the portfolio are newly designated major 
defense acquisition programs. The total acquisition cost of the 
thirteen new programs with cost data is over $72 billion.
• Twelve programs with a cost of $48 billion, including $7 billion in 
cost growth since their first estimate, left the portfolio. If FCS is 
included, these numbers increase to $179 billion and $48 billion
respectively.
• The lack of complete Selected Acquisition Reports in 2009 
precluded a definitive analysis of the overall cost and schedule
performance of the portfolio.
PORTFOLIO LEVEL
4Observations on DOD’s Fiscal Year 2009 
Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolio
• The Secretary of Defense’s fiscal year 2010 budget recommended 
canceling or curtailing all or part of at least a half dozen major defense 
acquisition programs, including CSAR-X, DDG 1000, FCS, and VH-71.




Recommended ending production at 187 aircraft.F-22
Recommended ending production at 205 aircraftC-17
Plan to reexamine requirements; no mention of new 
program
Ballistic Missile Defense–Multiple Kill 
Vehicle
Plan to buy two more AEHF satellites as alternativeTransformational Satellite
Plan to reevaluate requirements, technology, and 
approach before relaunching and recompeting program
Future Combat Systems–Manned 
Ground Vehicles
Will not initiate new development program without 
better understanding of requirements and technology
Next-Generation Bomber
Plan to reexamine requirementsCombat Search and Rescue Helicopter
Plan to develop options for new programVH-71 Presidential HelicopterRecommended 
terminations
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
PORTFOLIO LEVEL









Technologies, time, funding and
other resources match customer needs.









• Model provides framework for incremental, time certain (development constrained to 5 to 6 years 
or less), and knowledge-based approach to weapon system acquisitions.
• Success requires structured, disciplined application and adherence to model.
• Knowledge points align with key investment inflection points.
• Controls are in place for decisions makers to measure progress against specific criteria and 
ensure managers capture key knowledge before moving to next phase.
Knowledge Point 2
Design is stable and performs 
as expected.
Decision to start building and testing 
production representative prototypes. 
Knowledge Point 3
Production meets cost, schedule, 
and quality targets.
Decision to produce first units for 
customer.
5 to 6 years or less
PROGRAM LEVEL
6Programs Conducting Early Systems 
Engineering Have Better Outcomes
• Early systems engineering, ideally before a program enters 
development, is critical to ensuring that requirements are 
achievable and designable.
• We have previously reported that programs conducting key 
systems engineering events prior to development start experienced, 
on average, lower cost growth and shorter delays in achieving initial 
operational capability.
• Only 1 of the 37 programs in our 2010 assessment that held PDR 
did so before development start. The remaining programs, on 
average, held the review 30 months after development start.
• Preliminary design review now required prior to development start 
under the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009.
PROGRAM LEVEL
7Newer Programs GAO Assessed Are Starting 
with Higher Levels of Technology Maturity
• Since 2003, there has been an 
increase in the maturity of critical 
technologies at development start.
• All 6 programs entering system 
development from 2006 to 2009 
had their critical technologies 
demonstrated in at least a relevant 
environment, in accordance with 
the DOD and statutory criteria.
• However, only 4 of the 29 
programs in our 2010 assessment 
that provided data started 
development with fully mature 
critical technologies.
Note: Number of programs and technologies in parentheses.
Maturity of Critical Technologies at Milestone B
PROGRAM LEVEL
8Programs Holding Design Reviews in Recent 
Years Reported Having More Knowledge
• Since 2003, the average 
percentage of design drawings 
releasable for programs at the 
critical design review has steadily 
increased.
• However, designs, on average, are 
still far from stable and concurrent 
technology development increases 
the risk subsequent design 
changes and rework.
• Of the 28 programs in our 2010 
assessment that held a critical 
design review, only 8 reported 
having a stable design.
Note: Number of programs in parentheses.
Average Percent of Releasable Design Drawings 
at Critical Design Review
PROGRAM LEVEL
9Programs Are Not Testing Prototypes in Time 
to Prove Out Designs and Performance 
• Programs should test integrated prototypes before critical design review to 
demonstrate that the design is capable of meeting requirements.
• Only 4 of 33 programs in our 2010 assessment tested or planned to test an 
integrated prototype before critical design review. The remaining programs 
reported that they will test these prototypes, on average, 31 months later.
3118272974For programs testing after critical design 
review, average number of months from 
design review to prototype test
2951563Number of programs testing after critical 
design review
40301Number of programs testing before critical 
design review
All programs2010 or later2006-20092004-20052003 or prior
Year of critical design review
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
PROGRAM LEVEL
10
Programs Are Not Demonstrating Performance or 
Manufacturing Processes Before Production
• Programs should test production 
representative prototypes before 
production start and bring critical 
manufacturing processes into 
statistical control.
• Only 17 of the 31 programs in our 
2010 assessment that reported a 
production date have tested or 
planned to test a production 
representative prototype before 
production.
• Only 7 programs in our 2010 
assessment had identified their 
critical manufacturing processes.
Programs Testing Production Representative 
Prototype Before and After a Production Decision
PROGRAM LEVEL
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Observations on Other Factors That Can 
Affect Program Execution
• Requirements: Of the 42 programs in our 2010 assessment, 23 programs 
reported at least one change to a key performance parameter and 9 
programs experienced at least one change to a key systems attribute since 
development start.
• Software: Seventeen of the 28 programs that reported software data 
estimated that software lines of code had grown by 25 percent or more 
since development start. The average lines of code growth was 92 percent.
• Program office staffing: Nineteen of 50 programs that responded to our 
staffing questions were able to fill all authorized positions. As a result, 
program offices reported that program management and oversight had 
been degraded, contracting activities had been delayed, and program 
management costs had increased as contractors were used to fill gaps.
PROGRAM LEVEL
12
Observations on Other Factors That Can 
Affect Program Execution
• Programs’ reliance on non-governmental personnel continues to increase 






















Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Program Office Composition for 50 DOD Programs
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New DOD Policies Could Improve Outcomes
• Recent department initiatives may help focus on joint warfighter needs 
• Functional COCOMs given greater voice in requirements process.
• Preferred materiel solutions no longer identified in initial capability proposals, 
giving greater emphasis to trade-off analysis via AOAs.
• New Capability Portfolio Management framework could facilitate more 
strategic investment choices
• Portfolio managers provided key input in recent budget cycle, but they do not 
have decision-making authority.
• More discipline and up-front knowledge in early acquisition phases could put 
programs on more stable footing
• Early Materiel Development Decision required for all programs.
• Preference for incremental development, with baselines for each increment.
• PDR required before system development start.
• Competitive prototyping required as part of technology development phase.
• Configuration Steering Boards established to control requirements creep.
ACQUISITION REFORMS
14
Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act 
Stresses Cost and Performance Assessment
• Elevates the role of cost assessment and program evaluation
• Duties of Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CA&PE) include 
reviewing cost estimates, conducting independent cost estimates, and 
approving the choice of baseline cost estimates for all ACAT ID programs.
• Director, CAPE, will also formulate study guidance for analysis of alternatives.
• Emphasizes importance of systems engineering and developmental test
• Established Directors of Developmental Test and Evaluation and Systems 
Engineering to oversee policy and guidance and approve test and systems 
engineering plans.
• Requires services to periodically assess their capabilities in these areas.
• Increases oversight and reporting on cost estimating, systems engineering, 
developmental test, program performance, and technology maturity.
• Stresses importance of competition throughout the acquisition cycle.
ACQUISITION REFORMS
15
Programs Have Begun to Implement DOD’s 
Revised Acquisition Policies
• Programs in our 2010 assessment have begun to implement 
acquisition reforms that could improve cost and schedule outcomes.
• Competitive prototyping – 8 of 10 pre-major defense acquisition 
programs in our assessment reported planning to develop competitive 
prototypes of the proposed weapon system or key system elements 
prior to Milestone B.
• Early systems engineering – 7 of 10 pre-major defense acquisition 
programs in our assessment have already scheduled a preliminary 
design review before Milestone B.
• Only a few programs in our 2010 assessment reported holding 
configuration steering board meetings in 2009.
• For 7 programs that held meetings in 2009, none reported that the 
board approved a requirement change or significant technical change.
• One program presented de-scoping options to the board and had 




DOD Investment Levels Remain High,
But Are Not Sustainable
Fiscal year 2011
dollars in billions
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation and Procurement Funding
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DOD’s Major Defense Acquisition Portfolio 
Has Experienced Poor Outcomes
Portfolio status   Fiscal year 2003 Fiscal year 2007 Fiscal year 2008 
Number of programs 77  95 96 
Total planned commitments $1.2 trillion  $1.6 trillion $1.6 trillion 
Commitments outstanding $724 billion  $875 billion $786 billion 
Change to total RDT&E costs from first estimate 37 percent  40 percent 42 percent 
Change in total acquisition cost from first estimate 19 percent  26 percent 25 percent 
Estimated total acquisition cost growth $183 billion  $301 billion $296 billion 
Share of programs with 25 percent or more increase 
in program acquisition unit cost 
41 percent  44 percent 42 percent 
Average delay in delivering initial capabilities 18 months  21 months 22 months 
 
Performance of DOD’s Major Defense Acquisition Program Portfolio
CONDITION
Source: GAO analysis of December 2007 Selected Acquisition Reports.
Note: Analysis was not updated for the fiscal year 2009 because DOD did not issue Selected Acquisition Reports.
19
Age of Program 
















15 or more years since 
development start 47 percent 19 percent -39 percent  37 months  10 
10 to 14 years since 
development start 
73 percent 53 percent 52 percent  26 months  17 
5 to 9 years since 
development start 
37 percent 31 percent 9 percent  22 months  25 
Less than 5 years 
since development start 
12 percent 11 percent 1 percent  5 months  28 
New Programs Are Performing Better Than 
Older Programs
Changes in Program Cost and Schedule by Age of Program
Fiscal Year 2008 Portfolio
CONDITION
Source: GAO analysis of December 2007 Selected Acquisition Reports.
Note: Analysis was not updated for the fiscal year 2009 because DOD did not issue Selected Acquisition Reports.
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Promised Capabilities Are Delivered Later 
Than Planned
Schedule Delays for DOD’s 2008 Program Portfolio
CONDITION
Note: Analysis was not updated for the fiscal year 2009 because DOD did not issue Selected Acquisition Reports.
Source: GAO analysis of December 2007 Selected Acquisition Reports.
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Consequences of Poor Outcomes
Cost Growth Schedule Delays
Reduces DOD’s 
buying power
Means less funding 
for other priorities
Critical capabilities not provided 
to warfighter when needed
DOD must request more funding to 
cover cost overruns, make trade-
offs with existing programs, delay 
the start of new programs, or take 
funds from other accounts
DOD must operate costly legacy 
systems longer than expected, find 
alternatives to fill capability gaps, or 
go without a capability
CONDITION
22
Program Managers Cited Requirements and 

































Strategic and Program Level Factors Lead to 
Poor Outcomes
STRATEGIC LEVEL
• DOD’s processes for 
determining warfighter needs, 
allocating resources, and 
managing acquisition programs 
are fragmented
• Success defined in terms of 
starting and sustaining  
programs
PROGRAM LEVEL
• Programs are proposed and 
approved without adequate 
knowledge about 
requirements and resources 
needed to execute them






Programs that Changed Key Requirements 
Experienced Added Instability
• For programs in our 2009 assessment that had at least one requirements 
change, the average RDT&E cost was more than three times higher and 
the average schedule delay was twice as long as programs without these 
changes.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
PROGRAM LEVEL
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Are Effective Controls In Place to Ensure a 
Knowledge-Based Approach is Followed?
DOD ACQUISITION POLICY
XConduct major milestone decision review for development start
Conduct independent program assessment
XConduct independent cost estimate
IAlign program manager tenure to complete development phase
IEnsure development phase fully funded (programmed in anticipation of milestone)
IConstrain development phase (5 to 6 years or less) for incremental development
XEstablish cost and schedule estimates for product on the basis of knowledge from preliminary 
design using system engineering tools (such as prototyping of preliminary design)
XEnsure that requirements for product increment are informed by preliminary design review using 
systems engineering process (such as prototyping of preliminary design)
IDemonstrate technologies to a high readiness level - technology readiness level 7 – to ensure 
technologies will work in an operational environment
Are controls present in DOD 5000 policy?Types of controls considered effective for ensuring knowledge-based approach
Knowledge Point 1: Technologies, time, funding, and other resources match customer needs. Decision to 
invest in product development.
X = Sufficient controls in place. Controls are considered effective if they are backed by specific criteria required for review, and if decision 
makers are required to consider the resulting data before deciding to advance a program to the next level.
I = Intent identified in the policy, but sufficient controls not in place by knowledge point.
26
Are Effective Controls In Place to Ensure a 
Knowledge-Based Approach is Followed?
DOD ACQUISITION POLICY
Conduct independent cost estimate
Conduct independent program assessment
IConduct major milestone decision review to enter system demonstration
IEstablish reliability targets and growth plan on the basis of demonstrated reliability rates of 
components and subsystems
IIdentify critical manufacturing processes
IIdentify key system characteristics
IComplete the failure modes and effects analysis
Demonstrate with system level integrated prototype that design meets requirements
IComplete subsystem design reviews
Complete 90 percent of engineering design drawing packages
XComplete system critical design review
Are controls present in DOD 5000 policy?Types of controls considered effective for ensuring knowledge-based approach
Knowledge Point 2: Design is stable and performs as expected. Decision to start building and testing 
production-representative prototypes.
X = Sufficient controls in place. Controls are considered effective if they are backed by specific criteria required for review, and if decision 
makers are required to consider the resulting data before deciding to advance a program to the next level.
I = Intent identified in the policy, but sufficient controls not in place by knowledge point.
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Are Effective Controls In Place to Ensure a 
Knowledge-Based Approach is Followed?
DOD ACQUISITION POLICY
XConduct major milestone decision review to begin production
Independent program assessment
XIndependent cost estimate
Demonstrate that critical processes are capable and in statistical control
Collect statistical process control data
Test production-representative prototypes to achieve reliability goal
IBuild and test production-representative prototypes to demonstrate product in intended 
environment
IDemonstrate manufacturing processes
Are controls present in DOD 5000 policy?Types of controls considered effective for ensuring knowledge-based approach
Knowledge Point 3: Production meets cost, schedule and quality targets. Decision to produce first units for 
customer.
X = Sufficient controls in place. Controls are considered effective if they are backed by specific criteria required for review, and if decision 
makers are required to consider the resulting data before deciding to advance a program to the next level.
I = Intent identified in the policy, but sufficient controls not in place by knowledge point.
